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1Real-Time Procurement Strategies of a Proactive
Distribution Company with Aggregator-Based
Demand Response
Chunyu Zhang, Member, IEEE, Qi Wang, Member, IEEE, Jianhui Wang, Senior Member, IEEE,
Pierre Pinson, Senior Member, IEEE, Juan M. Morales, Member, IEEE, and Jacob Østergaard, Senior
Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we present a real-time trading frame-
work for distribution networks where a rational aggregator is
identified as a broker by contracting with individual demands
and dealing with the distribution company. Demand response
capability is characterized by the coexistence of elastic and
inelastic demand components. A one-leader multi-follower bi-
level model is proposed to derive the procurement strategies, i.e.,
the upper-level problem intends to maximize the profit of the
proactive distribution company, while the lower-level expresses
the profit maximization per rational aggregator. The proposed
model is then transformed into a solvable mathematical program
with equilibrium constraints through a primal-dual approach. A
modified 33-bus distribution network is utilized to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Index Terms—Demand response (DR), rational aggregator
(RA), proactive distribution company (PDISCO), multi-period
AC power flow, mathematical program with equilibrium con-
straints (MPEC), mathematical program with primal and dual
constraints (MPPDC).
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
N Set of system buses, indexed by i or j.
B Set of distribution feeders, indexed by ij.
K Set of RAs, indexed by k.
L Set of demands, indexed by l.
T Set of time periods (e.g., hours per day),
indexed by t.
Ml Mapping of the set of demands onto the set
of buses.
MAgg Mapping of the set of demands onto the set
of aggregators.
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Variables
αlt Consumption of elastic portion of demand l
at time t.
βlt Virtual generation of elastic portion of de-
mand l at time t.
PAggkt ,Q
Agg
kt Active and reactive power produced by RA
k at time t.
λAggkt Marginal price for PDISCO purchasing pro-
duction from RA k at time t.
PDlt ,Q
D
lt Real-time active and reactive power con-
sumption of demand l at time t.
QDElt Reactive power output along with virtual
generation at demand l at time t.
λRDit Locational marginal price (LMP) at bus i at
time t.
PRTt ,Q
RT
t Active and reactive power exchanging in
real-time market at time t.
PLSlt ,Q
LS
lt Active and reactive power of load-shedding
at demand l at time t.
PFlowijt ,Q
Flow
ijt Active and reactive power flow through
feeder ij at time t.
QCit Reactive power produced by shunt compen-
sator at bus i at time t.
Vit,θit Voltage magnitude and phase angle at bus i
at time t.
Parameters
PSt ,Q
S
t Active and reactive power purchased from
day-ahead market at time t.
PDSIlt ,P
DSE
lt Active power purchased from day-ahead
market for inelastic and elastic portions of
demand at bus l at time t.
QDSElt Reactive power purchased from day-ahead
market for elastic portion of demand at bus
l at time t.
PDIlt Real-time inelastic portion of demand at bus
l at time t.
P
Aggmin/max
kt Active power production bounds of RA k.
Q
Aggmin/max
kt Reactive power production bounds of RA k.
λAggProkt Contract price between demand and RA k at
time t.
λSt Day-ahead market price at time t.
2λRTt Real-time price in the real-time market at
time t.
λLSt Load-shedding penalty price for PDISCO
operation at time t.
λD Electricity sales price to the demand from
PDISCO.
Q
Cmin/max
i Reactive power limits of shunt compensator
at bus i.
V
min/max
i Limits of voltage magnitude.
S¯ Capacity limit of main substation.
SFlowij Capacity limit of feeder ij.
Gij , Bij , bij Conductance, susceptance and charging sus-
ceptance of feeder ij.
τi Transformer tap ratio.
Γ Elasticity limit of real-time demand.
ζmin/max Bounds of consumption control factor.
δkt Profit guarantee factor of RA k.
ε Inelasticity control factor of each demand.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Aim and Approach
W ITH the increasing penetration and deployment ofdistributed resources such as demand response (DR),
distributed generation (DG), storage devices, etc., distribution
systems have become more active than the traditionally passive
networks. Distribution companies (DISCOs), as load serving
entities (LSEs), have started to get more engaged in electricity
market transactions and deal with both market participants in
the transmission-level wholesale market and the distribution-
level resources. For example, in the U.S., recent initiatives
led by the New York Public Service Commission have ad-
dressed regulatory changes to promote utilization of distributed
resources mentioned above, such as the New York Reforming
Energy Vision (NY REV) [1]. One of the main purposes of
NY REV is to establish a distribution-level market platform
where all distribution resources can transact and trade with
each other, which partly motivates this work. In this paper,
we assume the DISCO behaves as a proactive market player,
who has the ability to purchase or sell active power according
to the real-time market price and conduct bidirectional power
exchanging. We propose a modeling framework to capture the
procurement strategies of a proactive DISCO, focusing on its
interactions with DR aggregators.
As reviewed in [2], DR resources are normally small-size,
varied and dispersed, which are difficult to handle system-
wide, especially for the real-time operation. To this end,
nearly all the applications [3]–[5] and discussions [6], [7] are
concentrated on aggregated DR participation in the existing
markets at the transmission level, e.g., trading as a virtual plant
in the day-ahead market or real-time market. However, derived
from the demand side, DR is a natural candidate to directly
trade with a DISCO in the local area. Such an advantage
may stimulate DR providers to play an essential role in the
emerging real-time trading structure, which in turn improves
the competitiveness of the market and facilitates the DISCO’s
electricity procurements among differing resources.
To achieve this goal, at the distribution level, a real-time
trading setup is presented along with a newly defined rational
aggregator (RA) in this paper. Compared with the small-scale
DRs, a RA represents a group of smaller DR resources to
bid to the DISCO. Each aggregator concerned in this paper
is equipped with certain rationality. In other words, in this
competitive environment, each RA tries to fulfil the DISCO’s
requirement (procurement volumes and offering prices) by
rationally putting forward its kW quantities and bidding prices
to maximize its profit. For a DISCO, based on its purchase in
the day-ahead market, it has to make optimal decisions on
the procurements in the real-time market to adjust its position
and maximize its own profit through real-time exchanging,
RA virtual generation, possible load-shedding, in addition to
electricity sales revenue.
To model load shaving and load shifting, we assume all
of the elastic demand is shiftable among the hours. We
further divide the elastic demand into shavable and unshavable
components, which can capture the DR resource characteristics
in a flexible and comprehensive fashion. To the best of our
knowledge, no similar DR model in real-time trading has been
proposed in the technical literature.
In order to achieve an appropriate trade-off among real-
time market transactions, DISCO-RA trading, and others, a
multi-period AC power flow formulation is used to accurately
represent the underlying physics of the power networks.
Taking into account the listed considerations above, the op-
timal procurement problem of a proactive DISCO (PDISCO)
with RAs can be formulated with a bi-level structure. At
each time t, the upper-level problem indicates the PDISCO’s
optimal procurements for maximizing profit, the lower-level
problems describe multiple RAs’ decisions for rational bid-
ding, one per RA. Note that since the upper-lever problem is
non-linear and non-convex due to the involved AC power flow
constraints, while the lower-level problems are linear and thus
convex, the complexity of this model is increased.
As addressed in [8], this kind of bi-level problem can
be transformed into a single-level problem, in which the
lower-level problems can be replaced by their first-order
optimality conditions. Particularly, in view of the linearity
of lower-level RAs’ problems, the first-order conditions are
formulated by a primal-dual approach, containing primal and
dual constraints, and the strong duality requirements. This
approach is equivalent to the broadly utilized Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions, but of high computational efficiency
and tractability [8]. Then this reformulated problem renders a
mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC).
B. Literature Review and Contributions
The literature review is categorized as follows.
1) DISCO procurements: A day-ahead distribution company
acquisition market (DCAM) is proposed in [9], in form of
the pool market and bilateral contracts. The DISCO purchases
electricity according to the offers from DG units, customers,
the wholesale market, and contracted load-shedding options.
The load, DG units and DCAM objectives are all stipulated
in quadratic functions, while the model is just for one-
hour simulation. Further developed in [10], the DGs and
interruptible loads are seen as DRs, and a bi-level model
3is presented. The upper-level represents individual DISCO’s
profit maximization with its own DGs, the lower-level indi-
cates the day-ahead market clearing model for independent
system operator (ISO) to minimize generation costs and load-
shedding compensation. However, the DG output and load-
shedding price are fixed, and the network constraints are not
included. To evaluate the optimal contract pricing between
DISCO and DG owners, a bi-level model is also considered
in [11], the upper-level objective is to maximize the DG
owners’ profit (without any physical constraints), the lower-
level depicts the DISCO network constraints. To avoid the
nonconvexity of the constraints, the paper only concerns active
power and voltage magnitudes as decision variables, which
weaken the effectiveness of the numerical results. A bi-level
model is proposed in [12] to investigate the hierarchical market
structure between the distribution and transmission networks.
The upper-level problem represents the market participant’s
payoff maximization, and the lower-level problem minimizes
the operation cost of the network. However, the locational
marginal prices (LMPs) are not endogenously generated by
considering the power flow integration. From the management
perspective, in [13], a dynamic pricing mechanism is designed
to facilitate the aggregator-based DR to participate in the
energy schedule of a LSE. A bi-level problem is formulated
by taking the LSE as the leader and DR aggregators as the
followers. In particular, the DR aggregators are modeled by
multi-block utility functions. For simplicity, DC power flow is
imposed to model the distribution network, while the impacts
of the reactive power are ignored.
2) Real-time DR: The potential interests and feasible ap-
plications of real-time DR are illustrated in [14], in which
the price uncertainty is accommodated through robust opti-
mization, and the model formulation can be easily applied
in a small utility. In [15], a bi-level model is proposed to
maximize the retailer’s profit and optimize the consumer’s
behavior under real-time prices. A vital conclusion shows
that the real-time pricing is more effective in load shifting.
However, this approach depends on a transactional model
and lacks network constraints. In contrast, to enable the
flexible demand participating in existing electricity markets, a
novel pool market mechanism is reported in [16], and further
validated by [17]. Although the load shifting is realized by a
Lagrangian relaxation based heuristic approach, the network
constraints are still not modeled. From the energy management
perspective, considering the interactions between DG and the
main grid, a contract-based cluster [18] is promoted to initiate
DR to purchase or sell energy at a proper time. While this
approach also ignores the physical network impacts.
3) Bi-level approach: Recently, the bi-level game structure
and complementarity theory have been increasingly adopted in
electricity market modeling and analysis, typically reflecting
the market outcomes with multiple strategic players competing
in the decision-making process. To study the competitive
behavior among individual generating companies, an incom-
plete information bi-level model is proposed in [19]. For
strategically controlled microgrids (MGs) [20] in a distribution
network, a bi-level model for coordinated operation of the
distribution network operator and MGs is presented in [21].
In order to manage multiple MGs, a bi-level model is also
proposed in [22] to analyze the competitive situations between
an Energy Services Provider (a set of MGs) and a large central
production unit. The equilibrium obtained in an oligopolistic
electricity pool with network constraints is presented in [23].
DC multi-period power flow is implemented to simplify the
transmission network constraints. In the same market setting,
to investigate the wind power as a strategic producer, a
stochastic bi-level model is proposed in [24]. Pertaining to
the DISCO operational issue, a bi-level model is employed
on purchasing dispatchable DG and interruptible loads. From
the consumer perspective, the authors in [25] proposed an
alternative day-head auction scheme for consumer payment
minimization in the pool market, while a large consumer
procurement strategy is implicitly modeled in [26].
Considering the context above, the main contributions of
this paper are threefold:
1) Present a distribution-level trading framework for
PDISCO and DR resources.
2) Define a DR formulation for actuating the load shaving
and load shifting simultaneously.
3) Propose a methodology for simulating the PDISCO’s
optimal procurement between real-time power exchanging and
RAs’ bids, gaming with each RA’s bidding in a competitive
environment.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The real-
time PDISCO trading structure, DR definition and RA concept
are clarified in Section II. Section III proposes the PDISCO’s
real-time procurement model formulated by a bi-level model,
which is further translated into an MPEC with a primal-dual
approach. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is
verified by case studies in Section IV. Finally, some relevant
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. PDISCO PROCUREMENT
Traditionally, a DISCO seeks to supply the demands with
the lowest possible operation cost. In order to fulfil this goal,
the DISCO has to make appropriate decisions on procure-
ment from the day-ahead and real-time electricity markets
at the transmission level. Thus, the DISCO is exposed to
volatile real-time prices and demand uncertainties. With the
availability of DR resources, the DISCO has more flexibility
from the demand side. However, small-scale DRs are allocated
dispersedly and heterogeneously in the distribution system,
which makes it quite difficult to deal with. To address this
issue, RA is regarded as a new business player to assemble
and schedule the dispersed DR resources.
A. PDISCO
The aggregator-based DRs can offer the feasibility for
prompt load adjustment with superior performance in terms of
response time and cost. As shown in Fig. 1, as a profit-driven
company, besides supplying the local demands, the DISCO can
even execute ambitious schemes to procure excessive DR to
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Fig. 1. Real-time procurement framework of the PDISCO.
sell to the real-time market, performing as an active electricity
producer, which defines the so-called PDISCO procurement in
this paper.
To minimize the payment, the PDISCO has to determine the
amounts of electricity purchased from the day-ahead market,
transactions with the real-time market and the aggregator-
based DR. Note that, because the PDISCO has thorough
knowledge of the day-ahead market prices, the hourly pur-
chases (λSt , P
S
t ) from the day-ahead market are fixed at the
very beginning of the next day. Throughout the day, for each
time t, the real-time PDISCO trading occurs through the
power exchanging (selling or purchasing by λRTt , P
RT
t ) in the
real-time market, and the procurement (λAggkt , P
Agg
kt ) with the
aggregator-based DR.
Pay-as-bid (PAB) [2] pricing is assumed to be the pricing
mechanism between PDISCO and RAs, and one RA is stipu-
lated to submit only one bid at each time t. From a DR aggre-
gator perspective, to compete with the others, an aggregator
should behave rationally to meet the PDISCO’s request, and
send the proper bids (kW quantity and bidding price) to the
PDISCO, implying the target of its own profit maximization.
At the same time, according to the available real-time market
price, the dynamic active/reactive consumption, RA bids, and
possible load-shedding, further constrained by the physical
network and facility limits, the PDISCO has to optimize the
real-time trading decisions in a complex situation.
Therefore, the interactions between PDISCO and RAs can
be characterized by a bi-level game-theoretic model as dis-
cussed in Section III.
B. Demand Response
DI
lt
PInelastic portion (      ) Elastic portion (          )DSE
lt
P*
DSE
lt lt
ȕ P
Generation
(GEP)
DSE
lt lt
Į P
Consumption
(CEP) 
D
lt
PTotal active power consumption (     )
Fig. 2. Definition of demand response.
In this paper, a demand is defined as the summation of
both the inelastic portion and elastic portion. In the day-
ahead market, demand l takes both these portions (PDSIlt and
PDSElt ) into account to make an electricity purchase. In real-
time operation, as shown in Fig. 2, the inelastic portion PDIlt
is the indispensable consumption of demand l, and can be
deemed as the same quantity as PDSIlt . In addition, the elastic
portion can be assigned as ΓPDSElt (Γ > 1) and further divided
into two parts. The first part (referred to as αltPDSElt ) is for
the actual consumption of the elastic portion (CEP), which
represents the shifting flexibility of real-time demand during
time period t. This indicates the DR capability of load shifting.
The second part (denoted as βltPDSElt ) expresses the shavable
demand, which can be seen as virtual generation of the elastic
portion (GEP) managed by a RA and sold to the PDISCO.
This implies the DR function of load shaving. Thus, the total
active power consumption of demand l (PDlt ) consists of P
DI
lt
and αltPDSElt .
C. Rational Aggregator
At the distribution level, the new defined RA is a virtual
business entity, who is independent and has no physical
integration with the system network, but has the commercial
and technical abilities to behave rationally as follows:
1) For the sake of harvesting DR generations (GEPs), at
each time t, RA acquires individual GEPs with contracts, and
makes an optimal decision on pricing.
2) In the real-time trading process, as a competitive market
player, a RA satisfies the PDISCO’s request, self-evaluates the
availabilities of the contractual DRs, sets up the bidding price
and kW quantity, and bids to the PDISCO effectively.
3) After obtaining offers (procurement volumes and offering
prices) from the PDISCO, RA mobilizes the corresponding
GEP portfolios to meet the requirements. Besides, the PDISCO
also passes the related CEP shifting schedules to the RA on
the basis of system requirements, and the latter takes the
responsibility of executing the schedule.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Assumptions
The mathematical formulation of the proposed PDISCO
procurement model is based on the following assumptions.
1) We assume that a PDISCO owns and operates the dis-
tribution network, and physically connects to the transmission
grid via only one main substation.
2) As for the real-time trading, multi-period AC power flow
is adopted to represent the distribution network. We assume
only the active power can be traded in the real-time market
and between the PDISCO and RAs, since no uniform reactive
power market has evolved.
3) In the real-time market, when the PDISCO is recognized
as an active producer, its offering price is assumed to be
the marginal price cleared at the interconnection point (main
substation) with the transmission system, and its offering
volume is based on the surplus of individual RAs’ bids after
satisfying the distribution network constraints.
54) Each RA can explicitly predict the impact of its bids
(bidding prices and kW quantities), versus the PDISCO offers
(offering prices and procurement volumes). This is reflected
as the linking variable λAggkt within this bi-level model.
5) For simplicity, regarding each RA’s demand contract, all
the related demands are assumed to be paid with an identical
price.
B. Bi-level Model
Note that the upper-level and the lower-level problems are
interrelated with each other. The bid price and quantity, put
forward by the RAs from lower-level problems, impact the
PDISCO’s procurement decisions in the upper-level. On the
other hand, the upper-level problem determines the offering
price and procurement volume, which directly influence the
RAs’ profits in the lower-level problems. Therefore, the for-
mulation of the proposed bi-level model is made up of two
optimization levels, i.e. the upper-level (1)-(24) is for PDISCO
procurement decisions, and the lower-level (25)-(30) is for the
rational bidding of each RA.
Minimize
ΞAgg∪ΞPDISCO∪ΞDual
∑
t,k
λAggkt P
Agg
kt +
∑
t
λRTt P
RT
t
+
∑
t
λSt P
S
t +
∑
t,l
λLSt P
LS
lt − λD
∑
t,l
PDlt
 (1)
s.t.
0 ≤ αlt + βlt ≤ Γ,∀l, t (2)
PDIlt = P
DSI
lt ,∀l, t (3)
PDlt = P
DI
lt + αltP
DSE
lt ,∀l, t (4)
δktλ
AggPro
kt ≤ λAggkt ≤ λRTt ,∀k, t (5)
For the main substation (reference bus):
PSt + P
RT
t + β1tP
DSE
1t + P
LS
1t − PD1t
=
∑
1j,j 6=1
PFlow1jt ,∀t (6)
QSt +Q
RT
t +Q
C
1t +Q
DE
1t +Q
LS
1t −QD1t
=
∑
1j,j 6=1
QFlow1jt ,∀t (7)
θ1t = 0, (8)
V1t = 1, (9)(
PSt + P
RT
t
)2
+
(
QSt +Q
RT
t
)2 ≤ S¯2,∀t (10)
For the other buses:
βltP
DSE
lt + P
LS
lt − PDlt =
∑
ij,j 6=i
PFlowijt , : λ
RD
it
∀i, t, l : (l, i) ∈Ml (11)
QCit +Q
DE
lt +Q
LS
lt −QDlt =
∑
ij,j 6=i
QFlowijt ,
∀i, t, l : (l, i) ∈Ml (12)
PFlowijt = −τiV 2itGij + VitVjt [Gijcos (θit − θjt)
+Bijsin (θit − θjt)] ,∀i, j, t (13)
QFlowijt = τiV
2
itBij − 0.5bij + VitVjt [Gijsin (θit − θjt)
−Bijcos (θit − θjt)] ,∀i, j, t (14)
−pi ≤ θit ≤ pi,∀i, t (15)
V mini ≤ Vit ≤ V maxi ,∀i, t (16)(
PFlowijt
)2
+
(
QFlowijt
)2 ≤ (SFlowij )2 ,∀i, j, t (17)
QCmini ≤ QCit ≤ QCmaxi ,∀i, t (18)
0 ≤ PLSlt ≤ PDlt ,∀l, t (19)
0 ≤ QDElt ≤ QDSElt ,∀l, t (20)
PLSlt Q
D
lt = P
D
lt Q
LS
lt ,∀l, t (21)
βltP
DSE
lt Q
D
lt = P
D
lt Q
DE
lt ,∀l, t (22)∑
l,t
PDlt −
∑
l,t
PLSlt ≥ ζmin
∑
t
PSt , (23)
∑
l,t
PDlt −
∑
l,t
PLSlt ≤ ζmax
∑
t
PSt , (24)
PAggkt , Q
Agg
kt , βlt ∈ arg
{
Minimize
ΞAgg(∑
t
λAggProkt P
Agg
kt −
∑
t
λAggkt P
Agg
kt
)
(25)
s.t.
PAggkt =
∑
l:(l,k)∈MAgg
βltP
DSE
lt ,∀k, t : ηkt (26)
QAggkt =
∑
l:(l,k)∈MAgg
QDElt ,∀k, t : µkt (27)
PAggminkt ≤ PAggkt ≤ PAggmaxkt ,∀k, t : ρ−kt, ρ+kt (28)
QAggminkt ≤ QAggkt ≤ QAggmaxkt ,∀k, t : σ−kt, σ+kt (29)
0 ≤ βlt ≤ 1,∀t, l : (l, k) ∈MAgg : φ−lt , φ+lt
}
(30)
αlt, βlt, P
Agg
kt , Q
Agg
kt , λ
Agg
kt , P
D
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D
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DE
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λRDit , P
LS
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C
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−
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+
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−
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+
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PRTt , Q
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t , P
Flow
ijt , Q
Flow
ijt , θit, ηkt, µkt : free. (31)
where ΞAgg =
{
PAggkt , Q
Agg
kt , βlt
}
is the set of each lower-
level problem variables. ΞPDISCO =
{
αlt, λ
Agg
kt , P
D
lt , Q
D
lt ,
QDElt , P
LS
lt , Q
LS
lt , P
RT
t , Q
RT
t , P
Flow
ijt , Q
Flow
ijt , Q
C
it , Vit, θit
}
is
the set of upper-level problem variables. ΞDual =
{
λRDit , ηkt,
µkt, σ
−
kt, σ
+
kt, ρ
−
kt, ρ
+
kt, φ
−
lt , φ
+
lt
}
is the set of dual variables.
The objective (1) of the upper-level problem is to mini-
mize the PDISCO’s minus-profit, which comprises the cost
of purchasing the GEPs from RAs, exchanging power from
the real-time market, acquiring active power from the day-
ahead market, the penalty of possible load-shedding, and
the minus revenue of electricity sales to demands. For each
time t: Constraints (2) enforce the bounds of the GEP/CEP
produced/consumed by each demand. Constraints (3) impose
the real-time quantity of inelastic active power is the same
as purchased from the day-ahead market. Furthermore, con-
straints (4) indicate the consumed active power is composed of
the inelastic portion PDIlt and the CEP portion αltP
DSE
lt . From
the perspective of the PDISCO, associated with the bid control
6factor δkt (δkt ≥ 1,∀k, t), a RA profit guarantee mechanism
is yielded as the lower bound of constraints (5), which also
emphasizes the acceptable RA’s bidding price should be no
greater than the price from the real-time market (ceiling price).
Here, AC power flow is employed to formulate the real-
time operation model. For the main substation (reference bus),
constraints (6) and (7) represent the AC power balance, and
the voltage angle and voltage value are retained at a constant
level via constraints (8) and (9). The capacity limit of the main
substation is specified in constraints (10). For the other buses,
constraints (11), (12), (13) and (14) identify the AC power
flowing through the feeder i-j, and constraints (17) further
impose the capacity limits individually. Constraints (15) and
(16) identify the angle bounds and voltage limits for the other
buses. Constraints (18) describe the capacity bounds for each
compensator. Specifically for the potential load-shedding bus,
the amount of load curtailment invoked by the PDISCO is
capped with the constraints (19). Constraints (20) express
the limits of the elastic reactive power for each demand.
Constraints (21) and (22) keep the power factor in constant,
if the corresponding demand is involved in load-shedding or
GEP-generating. Constraints (23) and (24) state consumption
control over the whole timespan (e.g., 24 hours per day)
with the bounds ζmin/max. For instance, when ζmin=ζmax=1,
these constrains guarantee the consumption of each demand
across the whole timespan should be equal to the same amount
purchased by the PDISCO from the day-ahead market. That
means, these constraints ensure the load shifting between the
hours while maintaining the total consumption at a certain
level.
As indicated in (25), the objective of the lower-level prob-
lem is to minimize the minus-profit of each RA k, i.e. the
cost of purchasing GEPs from contractual demands minus the
revenue of selling the aggregated quantities to the PDISCO,
correspondingly. Observe that the PDISCO offering price λAggkt
is an upper-level decision variable treated as a parameter
within the lower-level problem. This means that once the
RAs rationally submit their bidding prices λAggkt with kW
quantities PAggkt , the PDISCO figures out the preferable offers
through the upper-lever problem. Constraints (26) and (27)
illustrate the valid GEPs (active power) with the essential
reactive power QDElt assembled by each RA, while the output
limits on individuals are imposed by constraints (28) and (29).
Constraints (30) preserve the GEPs of each demand ought to
be less than the amount PDSElt purchased from the day-ahead
market.
Finally, constraints (31) classify the positive variables and
free variables for this bi-level model.
C. MPEC
In this subsection, the bi-level model for the procurement
decision-making of the PDISCO with RAs is transformed into
a single-level optimization problem. Since each lower-level
problem is linear and thus convex, its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions are necessary and sufficient.
However, the complementarity derived from KKT conditions
is numerically difficult to be handled especially when the
upper-level PDISCO problem is already non-linear and non-
convex. Therefore, the KKT approach is not appropriate to
solve this bi-level problem tractably. To avoid complementarity
conditions, the Primal-dual approach [8], [27] is applied in this
paper, rendering a mathematical program with primal and dual
constraints (MPPDC).
Constraints (32)-(34) are dual constraints of lower-level RA
problems. The constraint (35) is the associated strong duality
equality, which ensures the equality of the primal and dual
objective function values, one per RA k.
Dual constraints:
λAggProkt − λAggkt + ηkt + ρ+kt − ρ−kt = 0,∀k, t (32)
µkt + σ
+
kt − σ−kt = 0,∀k, t (33)
−ηktPDSElt + φ+lt − φ−lt = 0,∀l : (l, k) ∈MAgg, t (34)
Strong duality equality:∑
t
(
λAggProkt P
Agg
kt − λAggkt PAggkt
)
+
∑
t
µkt ∑
l:(l,k)∈MAgg
QDElt
+∑
t
(
PAggmaxkt ρ
+
kt
−PAggminkt ρ−kt +QAggmaxkt σ+kt −QAggminkt σ−kt
)
+
∑
t,l:(l,k)∈MAgg
φ+lt = 0,∀k (35)
Substituting lower-level RA problems with MPPDC, the fi-
nal single-level model is to minimize the PDISCO’s objective,
subject to PDISCO’s constraints, RAs’ MPPDC constraints,
and declarations of positive and free variables, as shown in Fig.
3. The final non-linear model without complementarity can be
solved by the commercial off-the-shell large-scale non-linear
optimization solver CONOPT3 [28].
Fig. 3. The reformulated single-level model.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, a 33-bus distribution network [29] is modi-
fied to validate the effectiveness of the methodology proposed
in Section III. All cases are solved by CONOPT3 with GAMS
24.4.1 [28] on a 3.6 GHz Intel Core i7 processor carried out
on 16 GB of RAM and 64-bit Windows 7 system.
A. Data
The 33-bus distribution network presented in [29] is consid-
ered to be owned and operated by the PDISCO. The topology,
7feeder capacity, and impedance parameters are shown in this
section. Capacity of each feeder SFlowij is set to 10 MVA.
The main substation capacity limit S¯ is imposed to 20 MVA.
At the reference bus, the voltage is 1 p.u. with the voltage
angle of 0. The tap ratio τi per transformer is fixed to 1.
For the other buses, the bounds of voltage (V min/maxi ) are
0.9 and 1.1 p.u.. Each compensator’s output is enforced in
the range of 0-200 kVar. To address the inelastic portion per
demand, an inelasticity control factor ε is adopted to specify
this proportion, i.e. PDSIlt =εP
S
lt , P
DSE
lt =(1-ε)P
S
lt . Three RAs
are concerned to be hourly involved in the real-time trading
with the PDISCO, i.e. 24 times per day. The individual zoning
is initialed as, RA1 includes {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19, 20, 21, 23, 26},
RA2 contains {10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 25}, and
RA3 consists of {8, 9, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33}. Referring
to the NordPool [30] prices, the day-ahead market price λSt
and real-time market price λRTt can be estimated and given in
Table I-II, which also enumerate the day-ahead market volume
PSt , RA-demand contract price λ
AggPro
kt , and load-shedding
price λLSt .
For simplicity, the profit guarantee factor δkt held by
each RA k is identical and equal to 1.1. Other system-wide
parameters are imposed as: the demand purchase price λD=0.6
e/kW, elasticity limit Γ=1.2, daily consumption control factor
ζmin=ζmax=1.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF DAY-AHEAD AND REAL-TIME MARKETS
Time
t
Real-time
market price
λRTt
Day-ahead
market price
λSt
Day-ahead
market transaction
PSt
[Hour] [e/ kW] [e/ kW] [kW]
1 0.13 0.11 1114.50
2 0.12 0.10 1114.50
3 0.15 0.12 1300.25
4 0.11 0.10 1114.50
5 0.30 0.26 2972.00
6 0.32 0.27 2972.00
7 0.35 0.29 3343.50
8 0.40 0.30 3715.00
9 0.42 0.31 3715.00
10 0.66 0.58 6315.50
11 0.71 0.62 6687.00
12 0.74 0.64 6687.00
13 0.69 0.59 6315.50
14 0.50 0.38 3715.00
15 0.41 0.31 3715.00
16 0.40 0.30 3715.00
17 0.42 0.31 3715.00
18 0.60 0.53 5572.50
19 0.65 0.55 5944.00
20 0.67 0.56 6315.50
21 0.70 0.60 6501.25
22 0.35 0.27 2972.00
23 0.28 0.24 1857.50
24 0.15 0.12 1486.00
B. PDISCO Procurement and RAs’ Profits
The results of the PDISCO procurement are shown in Fig.
4 (a)-(b). As expected, during high-price hours (10-14, 18-
22) in the real-time market, the PDISCO performs as an
active producer. In the other time slots, PDISCO acquires very
little from RAs, who executes demand shifting according to
shifting schedules passed by PDISCO. Therefore, the demand
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR RAS AND DEMANDS
Time
t
RA1-demand
contract price
λAggPro1t
RA2-demand
contract price
λAggPro2t
RA3-demand
contract price
λAggPro3t
Load-
shedding price
λLSt
[Hour] [e/ kW] [e/ kW] [e/ kW] [e/kW]
1 0.05 0.08 0.06 8.00
2 0.05 0.08 0.07 8.00
3 0.05 0.09 0.07 9.00
4 0.04 0.07 0.05 7.00
5 0.11 0.18 0.15 16.00
6 0.12 0.20 0.16 17.00
7 0.13 0.22 0.17 18.00
8 0.15 0.24 0.19 20.00
9 0.16 0.25 0.20 21.00
10 0.24 0.41 0.33 35.00
11 0.26 0.42 0.36 36.00
12 0.28 0.43 0.37 37.00
13 0.25 0.40 0.32 34.00
14 0.18 0.26 0.21 22.00
15 0.15 0.24 0.20 20.00
16 0.14 0.22 0.18 20.00
17 0.15 0.25 0.19 20.00
18 0.20 0.36 0.30 31.00
19 0.21 0.36 0.29 32.00
20 0.22 0.41 0.30 33.00
21 0.24 0.42 0.33 35.00
22 0.12 0.22 0.16 17.00
23 0.11 0.19 0.15 16.00
24 0.06 0.09 0.07 8.00
consumes more in the low-price periods, and results in a more
rational load curve. Furthermore, to avoid an extremely high
penalty price, load-shedding is not used at any bus.
Regarding the PDISCO’s profit, we can observe that the
maximum income is not placed during hours 10-14 or 18-22,
but spread out in other time periods. That is because PDISCO-
RA trading shaves high-price peak load and shifts it to the
other hours, while the daily consumption remains unchanged
and the electricity purchase price λD by the demand side is
fixed. Thus, the PDISCO daily profit can reach e 17958.97.
Subsequently, the profit results of individual RAs are also
shown in Fig. 4 (b). At each time t, each RA rationally bids at
the equilibrium price and quantity, and dispatches individual
contractual demands. The daily profits of RA 1, RA2 and RA3
are about e 72.59 , e 164.83 and e 112.45, respectively.
C. Impact of Elasticity Limit Γ
As indicated in Section III, the elasticity limit Γ enforces
the the upper bound of GEP/CEP produced/consumed by each
demand l via constraint (2). Thus, Γ is the key factor impacting
the real-time demand consumption, PDISCO procurement
decision, RA bidding, and demand revenue, simultaneously.
Keeping the other parameters unchanged, given the increment
of Γ with 0.1 per interval, as shown in Fig. 5 (a), the
PDISCO’s daily profit, RAs’ profits and demand revenue keep
increasing rapidly, but tend to be flat when Γ goes beyond 1.4.
That implies, on the basis of system operation constraints,
the PDISCO has to find a trade-off among exchanging with
the real-time market, procuring RAs’ virtual generation, and
maintaining daily consumption at a critical level. On the other
side, extra availability of GEPs causes a more completive
market, some RAs (e.g., RA1 and RA2) may reduce their
interests in trading with PDISCO.
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Fig. 4. Results of the PDISCO procurement and RAs’ profits.
D. Impact of Inelasticity Control Factor ε
The inelasticity control factor ε directly reflects the con-
sumption characteristic, and indirectly affects the GEP per de-
mand, as illustrated in Section II-B. With the other parameters
unchanged, Fig. 5 (b) depicts the relations of daily PDISCO
profit, RA profit and demand revenue under differing ε values.
Observe that, with the ε increasing, the diminishing elasticity
results in limited trading possibilities among the participants.
E. Impact of Daily Consumption Control Factor ζmin/max
To embody the sensitivity of daily consumption adopted
in this proposed bi-level model, we categorize the control
factor ζmin/max into three cases. With the other parameters
unchanged, the results are shown in Fig. 5 (c).
1) Case 1: ζmin >1, ζmax >1. Compared with ζ allocated
in the range of [1-1.1], each market participant obtains slightly
more profit if the daily consumption is strictly controlled at
ζmin=ζmax=1. This indicates the PDISCO intends to evade
demand-side risks and hope consumption at each bus can be
realized as the same amount as purchased from the day-ahead
market.
2) Case 2: ζmin <1, ζmax >1. In this situation, this
proposed trading setup allows moderate arbitrage to have
both PDISCO and RAs to pursue higher profit. Compared
with case 1, we set ζ in [0.9-1.1] and [0.9-1]. Both of the
results show that, a proper bound of consumption control can
increase around 15% of the daily profit for the PDISCO, and
critically prompt 75%-87% of profit for individual RAs. Thus,
the demand obtains 81% extra revenues.
3) Case 3: ζmin <1, ζmax <1. With the tendency of
exacerbating arbitrage behavior, i.e. ζ is arranged in [0.8-0.9]
and [0.7-0.8], the RAs’ profits persist with a rising trend. On
the contrary, the PDISCO’s daily profit drops rapidly compared
to case 2, and a reduction of 23% from case 1.
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Fig. 5. Impacts of individual sensitive parameters.
Therefore, the moderate arbitrage strategy may be more
preferable for the PDISCO to maximize profit, also for RAs
9to trade with the PDISCO rationally.
F. Impact of Profit Guarantee Factor δkt
Aiming to be a profitable participant gaming with the
PDISCO, the profit guarantee factor δkt represents the ex-
pected price margin of RA k. As shown in Fig. 5 (d),
increasing δkt to 1.5 with 0.1 increments, the RAs’ profits
rise up sharply, while the PDISCO’s daily profit decreases
progressively and the demand revenue stays at a certain
level. On one hand, this validates the PDISCO is willing
to continuously procure RAs’ virtual generation under the
premise that the bidding prices λAggkt are comparable to the
real-time price λRTt . On the other hand, to maximize RA’s own
profit, the procurement price λAggProkt should be optimized
with the contractual GEP providers.
G. Impact of RA Procurement Price λAggProkt
To capture the characteristics of RA procurement price
λAggProkt , we assume the data in IV-A represents a base case
and impose a λAggProkt multiplier from [0.5-2.5]. Fig. 5 (e)
indicates the PDISCO’s daily profit declines gradually, while
each RA has varied performance. For RA1 and RA3, their
profits are maximized at multiplier=2 and go down immedi-
ately afterwards, since their bidding prices are approaching the
price ceiling λRTkt . Prior to that point, a similar observation can
be obtained from RA2. Accordingly, the PDISCO’s profit has
been reduced significantly at each time when a RA quits real-
time trading. When multiplier=2.5, RA1 is left as the single
player to trade with PDISCO. In this case, the PDISCO-RA
trading turns into a monopolistic structure.
H. Impact of Number of RAs
In the proposed approach, associated with a certain number
of RAs, the PDISCO makes optimal decisions on electricity
procurements. To test the PDISCO’s profitability through
multiple RA combinations, κ is used to distinguish the number
of RAs, and the results are shown in Fig. 6.
1) κ = 1: As a base case, if no RA exists in this PDISCO-
RA trading model, the daily PDISCO profit is e 12938.88.
Particularly, RA1, RA2 and RA3 respectively represent the
participants with the low, high, and medium prices involved in
the PDISCO-RA trading process. As mentioned above, a single
RA interacting with the PDISCO is in a monopolistic setting.
We can observe that the RA’s bidding price goes higher while
the PDISCO’s profit gets lower, e.g., RA1 bids with λAggPro1t
and the PDISCO gains e 21651.20 daily profit, in contrast,
RA2 bids with λAggPro2t and the PDISCO’s profit reduces to
e 19930.40.
2) κ = 2: The observation mentioned above can also be
obtained in the two-RA case, which denotes a moderately
competitive market. The PDISCO’s profit shows a reverse
trend with the RA’s bidding prices, and the lowest profit (e
18543.44) appears in the existence of RA2 and RA3.
3) κ = 3: In a more competitive market case, the PDISCO
claims more RA virtual generation, and three rival RAs
compete with each other on bidding prices and quantities to
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Fig. 6. Impact of integrated RA number κ.
maximize their own profit. Contrarily, the PDISCO’s profit
further declines to e 17958.97, but still shows 39% higher
than the non-RA case.
Among these cases, the demand revenue grows gradually
along with the increasing number κ of RAs, and presents an
opposite trend against the PDISCO’s profit.
TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL TIME PER NUMBER κ
Number RA CUP time (s)
κ=1
RA1 39.76
RA2 41.33
RA3 36.82
κ=2
RA1, RA2 99.62
RA1, RA3 100.31
RA2, RA3 96.54
κ=3 RA1, RA2, RA3 294.78
Table III shows the computational time required for solving
the problem pertaining to each number of RAs. Observe that
the computational time increases dramatically along with the
growth of number κ. Although the computational performance
is κ-dependent, it is remarkable that the computational effort
is acceptable for a hourly-based setting.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a bi-level model for a PDISCO to make
optimal procurement with the aggregator-based DR resources
in the presented real-time trading framework. The PDISCO
and RAs’ decisions are modeled through upper and lower-
level problems. Combining with commercial and physical con-
straints, this model can explicitly address the strategies of the
PDISCO’s procurement about real-time market exchanging,
RAs’ GEP-generating, and load shedding. This proposed bi-
level model is finally transformed into an MPEC for compu-
tational efficiency and tractability. The numerical results and
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impact analyses are fully discussed to validate the effectiveness
of the proposed methodology.
Based on the proposed hierarchical market framework, it
is relevant to note that stochastic DGs and storages could be
included by aggregators. The aggregators can be classified into
various types according to the characteristics of distributed en-
ergy resources. For instance, wind generations can be grouped
as a type of aggregators, and batteries can be another type.
Therefore, the formulations of differing aggregators vary. This
topic can be studied in our future work.
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